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  The paper studies a Partial Cartel model where only a subset of firms 
colludes. In this model, firms' ability to collude depends on the discount factor. In 
addition, as hardly any attention has been given by the literature to the case 
where mergers take place in a collusive framework, the purpose of this paper is to 
analyze the competitive effects of horizontal mergers on profits and welfare in a 
Partially Cartelized market. We show that both mergers among fringe and cartel 
firms increase market price. Regarding merger profitability, the discount factor 
decreases cartel members' merger profitability. However, the higher cartel 
members' discount factor, the more fringe firms will be willing to merge. An 
example of this could be the intense wave of mergers among oil firms that 
coincided with a large period of high oil prices caused by the OPEC production 
cuts. 
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 1 Introduction
Faced with the multiplicity of equilibria arising in repeated games1, most applied papers
have focused on studying the equilibrium where industry proﬁts are maximized assuming
that all ﬁrms participate in the collusive agreement. However, at least to the best of our
knowledge, little attention has been paid to the situation where not all the ﬁrms of the
industry join the cartel (an exception is Martin (1993) to be commented later on)2.
In practice, there are many cases where collusive agreements do not involve all ﬁrms
in the industry. However given that it is diﬃcult to determine which ﬁrms really belong
to the cartel, we will refer to tested cases previously investigated by antitrust authorities.
Looking at the most recent measures of the European Commission against collusion,
we see that several cartels have been ﬁned hundreds millions euros by the European
Commission for price ﬁxing and setting sales quotas. At the same time it is also veriﬁed
that in many of these industries, not all ﬁrms in the industry were ﬁned. For example,
in the carbonless paper industry, the joint market share of the ﬁned ﬁrms was between
85 and 90%. In the North Atlantic shipping industry, the market share of the cartel
was calculated around 70-80%, or in the cartonboard industry where the market share of
the cartel is assumed to be around 80%. Another signiﬁcant example is the citric acid
industry where three North-American and ﬁve European ﬁrms were convicted in United
States, Canada and the European Union and ﬁned more than one hundred million euros
for ﬁxing prices and allocating sales in the worldwide market, issuing coordinated price
announcements and monitoring one another’s prices and sales volumes during the period
1991-19953. The joint market share of these eight ﬁrms was only between 50% and 60%
1The “Folk Theorems” show that any individually rational payoﬀ vector of a one-shot game of complete
information can arise in a perfect equilibrium of the inﬁnitely-repeated game if players are suﬃciently
patient (see for example Friedman (1971), Aumann, R, Shapley, L. (1976), Rubinstein, A. (1979) or
Fudenberg et al. (1986)).
2There is a well-known literature where the industry structure is characterized by a small group of
ﬁrms plus a competitive fringe. However this literature investigates cartel stability in static models where
it is assumed that binding contracts could be signed. The seminal papers in this literature are Selten
(1973) and d b4Aspremont et al. (1983), see also Shaﬀer (1995), Donsimoni (1986) or Thoron (1998) for
example.
3U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department’s Ongoing Probe Into Food and Feed Additives
Yields Second Largest Fine Ever, Press Release, January 29, 1997.
3(see Levenstein, Suslow et al.(2002)).
Despite this empirical evidence, the Industrial Organization analysis of tacit collusion
in quantity setting supergames, has generally focused on the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium that maximizes industry proﬁts. However, the continuum of equilibria in
supergames allows us to select equilibria such that only a subset of ﬁrms colludes. Indeed,
there is a seminal paper on partial cartels (Martin 1993 p.111) from where we get the
inspiration. He considers that only a subset of ﬁrms belongs to the cartel and the rest
are called fringe ﬁrms. Then, he studies conditions on the discount factor such that the
outcome where cartel ﬁrms behave as a Stackelberg leader and fringe ﬁr m sa sf o l l o w e r s
can be sustained as an equilibrium of the repeated game using “trigger” and “stick and
carrot” strategies. We extend Martin (1993) model by identifying the best equilibrium for
cartel ﬁrms using “trigger” strategies for each discount factor. (This means that for any
value of the discount factor of cartel ﬁrms, some degree of collusion is always achieved).
It coincides with the Stackelberg-follower model for high discount factors and converges
to the Cournot outcome when the discount factor tends to zero.
Although the framework with partial cartels we set can be used to study diﬀerent
subjects, we specialize the model to deal with the issue of mergers. Curiously, while
there exists a substantial literature on the eﬀect of mergers when pre- and post-merger
behavior is noncooperative, little attention has been given by theorists to the consequences
for ﬁrms of mergers when they take place in a collusive environment. In fact, despite its
inﬂuence in matters of policy, there is almost no formal evidence from theory regarding
the relationship between mergers and collusion4. Then, the purpose of this paper is to
analyze the competitive eﬀects of horizontal mergers on proﬁts and welfare in a partial
cartel model. In the sparse literature on the subject the eﬀect of mergers is analyzed
seeing which is the eﬀect on the potential sustainability of the collusive agreements. This
is reﬂected on the eﬀect of mergers on the minimum discount factor required for collusion
to be sustainable and it is commonly believed that mergers by reducing the number of
competitors facilitate collusion. Due to the particular characteristics of our partial cartel
4One contribution of interest is that of Davidson and Deneckere (1984) where they do not allow for a
redistribution of output among ﬁrms after the merger, so it is assumed that each merged ﬁrm conserves
their pre-merger cartel quota after the merger. This makes that horizontal mergers may make more
diﬃcult for a cartel to maintain its integrity
4model, the result of studying the eﬀect of mergers on the threshold of the discount factor
above which (full) collusion is sustained is ambiguous. In our case, when ﬁrms fail to
sustain full collusion they can nevertheless achieve some degree of collusion. Thus, it
would be more informative to study the eﬀect of mergers on a variable that better reﬂects
the degree of collusion achieved in the economy. It seems that price is the most indicated
candidate.
Then, the ﬁrst result obtained is that mergers of either cartel or fringe ﬁrms help
collusion as long as they raise price. The second result obtained is that the capacity
to achieve agreements, represented by the discount factor, crucially determines merger
proﬁtability. When mergers among cartel ﬁrms are considered, we obtain that the higher
the discount factor, the lower merger proﬁtability. The basic intuition is that, in the
absence of cost savings derived from mergers, the main goal of merging is to reduce
competition. However, if ﬁrms can achieve this goal by colluding since the discount factor
is high enough, mergers are not proﬁtable.
In contrast, as the discount factor increases, mergers among fringe ﬁrms become more
proﬁtable. In a linear oligopoly Cournot market, two ﬁrms never have an incentive to
merge (see Salant et al., 1983), as non-merging ﬁrms react to the merger expanding
its production. Our last result is explained by the fact that when the discount factor
increases, cartel ﬁrms react expanding less their production in response to the merger of
fringe ﬁrms.
We have an interesting example. Looking at what happened to the oil market in
1998-2000, we identify two diﬀerent phenomena. On one hand after being elected in 1998,
the Venezuelan leader Chávez worked with the OPEC president Mr. Alí Rodríguez to
reinvigorate the cartel5. In June 1998, in its 105th meeting, the cartel agreed a cut of
more than 2.5 million barrels a day. In March 1999, Mr. Rodriguez cut a deal with Saudi
Arabia, the world’s biggest producer, to reduce production by almost 2 million barrels a
day and reverse the slide in prices. That move encouraged the rest of OPEC’s 11 member
nations to follow suit.
On the other hand, during this period, many oil ﬁrms merged. We have diﬀerent
5”And now, OPEC has arisen again,” President Chavez declared, adding that ”its resurrection will
rightly be celebrated in this land of the birth of OPEC” CNN, September 26, 2000.
5examples: In 11/8/98, B.P. and Amoco. In 28/10/98, Japan Oil and Mitsubishi Oil. In
2/12/98, Exxon and Mobil. In 31/3/99, B.P. and Arco and in 14/9/99, TotalFina and
Elf.
Therefore, at the end of the 90’s, more or less simultaneously we could observe mergers
among what we can consider fringe ﬁrms, and the success of the cartel. Our model might
illustrate the basic economic intuition about the relationship between these two facts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, the central model of
the paper is set. In Section 3, the eﬀect of mergers on the price is analyzed. In Section 4,
merger proﬁtability is considered. We conclude in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
2P a r t i a l C a r t e l s
Consider n ﬁrms, which produce the same homogenous good in the same market for inﬁnite
p e r i o d s .F i r m sd i s c o u n tf u t u r ea tc o m m o na n dk n o w nf a c t o ro fδ ∈ [0,1). Suppose they
make output decisions simultaneously at the beginning of each period.
The Stage Game description is the following: We assume that the industry inverse
demand is piecewise linear:
p(Q)=m a x ( 0 ,a− Q) (1)
where Q is the industry output, and p is the price for the output and a>0 is the
demand parameter. Every ﬁrm has a constant marginal cost of production d,w h e r ea>d .
Let (K,F) be a partition of the player set. We assume that the subset K comprises k
(≤ n) ﬁrms of the industry, while the remaining (n−k) ﬁrms belong to the subset F.W e
will call hereafter ﬁrms that belong to the partition K,l i k ec a r t e lﬁrms, and ﬁrms that
belong to the partition F, like fringe ﬁrms.
Most of the literature has focused on studying the best (symmetric) equilibrium for
all ﬁrms in the industry. We are going to study instead the best (symmetric) equilibrium
for cartel ﬁrms, given that fringe ﬁrms maximize per period proﬁts, that can be sustained
as an equilibrium of the repeated game.
6We are going to consider “trigger strategies”. The essence of these strategies is the
following; ﬁrms join the cartel agreement given that all cartel members do so. In the event
of deviation, the “loyal” members of the coalition revert forever to the static (Cournot)
noncooperative equilibrium. This forces the deviant to do the same. The threat of such
retaliation is a deterrent to deviation if the gain from cheating is no greater than the
(discounted) per-period losses, which arise from the punishment.
Let σi,t denote the action of player i ∈ {1,...,n},a tm o m e n tt, t =1 ,2,...,∞.T h e
“trigger strategies” of both partition sets of ﬁrms can be described in the following way.
When the agreement is to produce q, the “trigger strategies” for cartel ﬁrms, i ∈ K,i s
given by:
σi,1 = q (2)
σi,t =
 
q if σj,h = q for any h<tfor j ∈ K, t ≥ 2.
qn Otherwise.
(3)





qf if σj,h = q for any h<tfor j ∈ K, t ≥ 2.
qn Otherwise.
(5)
We now look for the conditions on q and qf that make these strategies conform a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game. As far as fringe ﬁrms are
concerned, we have that as the future play of their opponents is independent of how they
play today, their optimal response is to play to maximize their current period’s payoﬀ.
Fringe ﬁrms do maximize per period proﬁts if they choose:
q
f =m a x {0,(
a − d − kq
n − k +1
)} (6)
7It is the Cournot equilibrium among fringe ﬁrms when the output of each cartel ﬁrm
is given by q.
We proceed to look for the value of q such that, given (6), the strategies (2) and (4)
are a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
We should deﬁne ﬁrst the proﬁt functions for cartel ﬁrms:
Cartel ﬁrms proﬁts when they play q and fringe ﬁrms play qf are:
Πc(q,qf)=( a − d − kq − (n − k)qf)q
Deviation proﬁts that a cartel ﬁrm obtains when he unilaterally deviates are:
Πd(q,qf,q i)=( a − d − (k − 1)q − qi − (n − k)qf)qi
The quantity produced by the cheating cartel ﬁrm (qd
i) is deﬁned like follows:
qd
i =a r gm a x
qi
Πd(q,qf,q i)
A trigger strategy supports noncooperative collusion if the present-discounted value of
the income stream from adhering to the cartel is at least as great as the present-discounted
value of the income stream from defection, which is deviating proﬁts of one period, plus
the proﬁts of the punishment path, that is (discounted) static Nash equilibrium proﬁts.
For the case at hand, the condition for the cartel ﬁr m st ob ep l a y i n gaS u b g a m eP e r f e c t











However, we have multiplicity of equilibria as for each δ, (7) holds for several cartel
ﬁrms’ production (q). To solve the multiplicity of equilibria we consider the allocation,
which is the best for the cartel i.e. maximizes cartel ﬁrms’ proﬁts6. Therefore, it is the





6This is also the widely extended way to solve the multiplicity of equilibria in inﬁnitely repeated games












The unique maximizer of Πc(q,qf) is denoted by q.I fδ ≥ δ, restriction (9) evaluated
at q is satisﬁed and, in those cases, q is the solution to the whole program. For δ < δ the
solution to the program is given by the output that satisﬁes (9) with equality and it is
denoted by q(δ).






q(δ) if δ < δ
q if δ ≥ δ
The equilibrium strategies we are going to consider are (2) and (4) when:
q = qc
qf =(
a − d − kqc
n − k +1
)
O b s e r v et h a ta si n(8) we chose the best equilibrium for the cartel, kq is the output of
a unique Stackelberg leader. This is the production that cartel members want to achieve,





i.e. it does not
depend on the number of ﬁrms in the fringe and it amounts to the monopoly output. Then
the best for cartel ﬁrms is to sustain the monopoly output in the repeated game. It is
only possible when δ ≥
_
δ and then we say that full collusion is sustained. Otherwise, full
collusion can not be obtained because ﬁrms discount the future too much. The question
is how the cartel quota should be adjusted in those cases in order to achieve the maximal
level of collusion. It turns out that it crucially depends on the number of ﬁrms in the
cartel.
9When most ﬁrms belong to the cartel (k>n+1
2 ), quotas should be adjusted upwards
in order to reduce the incentives to deviate from the cartel agreement. The reason is that
output from all ﬁrms except the deviator move in the same direction as the quotas. Then
the residual demand left to the deviator is lower, and therefore it gains less by deviating.
This adjustment should be greater the lower the discount factor, reaching the standard
Cournot output when δ =0 .
However, when most ﬁr m sb e l o n gt ot h ef r i n g e ( k<n+1
2 ), quotas must be adjusted
downwards in order to reduce the incentives to deviate. The reason is that the output from
all ﬁrms except the deviator move in the opposite direction than the quotas because fringe
ﬁrms increase their output when the quota is reduced. And this eﬀect now dominates
because fringe ﬁrms are the majority. This adjustment should be greater the lower the
discount factor, reaching again the standard Cournot output when δ =0 .
Figures 1 and 2 represent the value of the quotas and the output of the fringe ﬁrms
as a function of the discount factor for the two cases discussed above.
The evolution of individual outputs has a direct consequence on the evolution of price.
It decreases with the discount factor when k<n+1
2 and it increases when k>n+1
2 .A sδ
increases, cartel ﬁr m sa r ec l o s e rt oa c h i e v et h e i ro b j e c t i v e .T h eq u e s t i o ni st h a ti td i ﬀers
depending on whether they are a majority or a minority. In the former case, the objective
is to reduce output in order to increase price given that they control most of the market.
In the latter case, their objective is to increase market share although this leads to a price
cut. In any case, proﬁts of the cartel ﬁrms are increasing with the discount factor because
as δ increases, cartel ﬁrms are closer to the joint proﬁt maximizing outcome. However,
fringe ﬁrms’ proﬁts are only increasing in δ whenever k>n+1
2 .I nt h i sc a s e ,a sδ increases,
fringe ﬁrms expand their output in order to take advantage of the high price motivated
by the output reduction agreed by cartel members. This leads fringe ﬁrms’ proﬁts to
increase with δ.
An interesting comparison that could clarify how this partially cartelized market works
would be to compare cartel and fringe ﬁrms proﬁts. Thus we deﬁne the following proﬁt
functions, which are cartel and fringe ﬁrms’ proﬁts respectively when the structure of the















































n,k =( a − kq






n,k =( a − kq








n,k) whenever they are in a minority position (k>n+1
2 ). The reason can
be obtained in Figure 1: fringe ﬁrms produce then more than cartel ﬁrms (qf >q c). If
instead, fringe ﬁrms are in a majority position (k<n+1
2 ), fringe ﬁrms’ proﬁts are not only






We can see the output of fringe and cartel ﬁr m sa saf u n c t i o no fδ for a given industry
size n and partition K.
123 The impact of mergers on collusion
Once we understand how this partially cartelized market works, we proceed to study how
mergers among ﬁrms change the picture. There are two diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in the
model, the ones that belong to the cartel and the ones that belong to the fringe. We only
consider mergers among ﬁrms of the same type and the merged ﬁrm has the same type as
the merging partners. Furthermore, given the assumptions on costs, the merger does not
bring any cost eﬃciency and then the merged entity is like any other independent ﬁrm of
the same type. Therefore, starting from a situation with n ﬁrms and k cartel members,
the merger of m +1cartel ﬁrms leads to a market with n − m independent ﬁrms and
k − m cartel members. Similarly, the merger of m +1fringe ﬁrms turns the market into
a situation with n − k ﬁrms and k cartel members.
This Section is motivated by the fact that little attention has been given by theorists
to the consequences of mergers when postmerger behavior is collusive. In the sparse
literature on the subject the eﬀect of mergers is analyzed seeing which is the eﬀect on
the potential sustainability of the collusive agreements. This is reﬂected on the eﬀect of
mergers on the minimum discount factor required for collusion to be sustainable7.
To focus the discussion we recall the result belonging to this literature most closely
related to our setting. In the repeated symmetric Cournot game with linear demand and
costs (Vives (1999)), the monopoly outcome can be sustained if δ ≥
(n+1)2
(n+1)2+4n = δ(n),
where n is the number of ﬁrms. Then as
∂δ(n)
∂n > 0, we have that it is harder to collude with
more ﬁrms. Then, mergers by reducing the number of competitors facilitate collusion8.
My model diﬀers from those models in two accounts. On the one hand, I do not study
7Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) study collusion in a setting with ﬁrms with asymmetric capacities.
They show that the main problem for collusion is to prevent the largest ﬁrm from deviating. Then
the eﬀect of mergers is ambiguous whenever it involves the largest ﬁrm. On the one hand, it reduces
the number of competitors what tends to hurt collusion. But on the other hand it increases the size
of the largest ﬁrm, what increases its incentives to deviate. In their case, restricting attention to the
sustainability of (full) collusion is validated by the fact that (full) collusion is sustainable whenever some
collusion is sustainable.
8In the same setting, Davidson and Deneckere (1984) obtain the opposite result by assuming that
ﬁrms are not allowed to redistribute output after a merger, which means that whenever the cartel is
active, merged ﬁrms produce their pre-merger cartel quota. If m +1ﬁrms merge, then full collusion is




(n−1)2(n−m+2)2+4n((n−m+2)2−4n),w h e r e
∂δ(n,m)
∂m > 0.
13collusion at the industry level but the ability of a subset of ﬁr m st or e a c hac o l l u s i v e
agreement (although the ﬁrst case is obtained in the limit case when k = n). On the
other hand, for any δ some degree of collusion is always achieved (outright competition is
only obtained when δ =0 ).
When δ ≥
_
δ(n,k) cartel ﬁrms can sustain full collusion i.e. their best preferred
market outcome. But for δ <
_
δ(n,k) proﬁts of cartel ﬁrms are always greater than the
ones obtained with competition as cartel ﬁrms achieve the maximum degree of collusion
they are able given their discount factor.
Following the logic of the aforementioned models we could study the eﬀect of mergers
on
_
δ(n,k). Surprisingly, the result is ambiguous. Mergers can make either easier or more
diﬃcult for cartel ﬁrms to sustain full collusion.
On the one hand, as
_
δ(n,k)=
(n +1 ) 2
(n +1 ) 2 +4 k(n +1− k)
the merger of m +1cartel ﬁrms helps (full) collusion if
m<(n +1 )







δ(n,k). It hinders (full) collusion if the inequality in (12)
is reversed. On the other hand, the merger of m +1fringe ﬁrms helps (full) collusion if:
m<(n +1 )
n +1− 2k




δ(n − m,k) <
_
δ(n,k). It hinders (full) collusion if the inequality in (13) is
reversed.
These disappointing results may not be so important in my case where ﬁrms when
they fail to sustain full collusion can nevertheless achieve some degree of collusion. In
my case, it would be more informative to study the eﬀect of mergers on a variable that
better reﬂects the degree of collusion achieved in the economy. It seems that price is the
most indicated candidate for that purpose. And then, a robust conclusion is obtained:
mergers always increase price. This result is developed in the following Propositions that
deal respectively with the case of mergers of cartel ﬁrms and mergers of fringe ﬁrms. This
result seems to invalidate the approach taken so far to focus on the ability of ﬁrms to
achieve (full) collusion.
14Proposition 1 Any merger of cartel members increase price.
The increase is always strict except for high values of the discount factor such that
(full) collusion is sustained both pre-merger and post-merger. If m+1cartel ﬁrms merge,
price does not change with the merger if
δ ≥ max{
_
δ(n − m,k − m),
_
δ(n,k)}
Then both pre-merger and post-merger full collusion is sustained what means that the
joint output of the ﬁrms in the cartel amounts to
a − d
2
.T h e nf r i n g eﬁrms do not change
either their output and price is unaﬀected by the merger.
Observe that when k = n the above Proposition encompasses the case previously
analyzed in the literature where all ﬁrms participate in the collusive agreement. My
model is richer though because, for any δ, collusion is exploited at its maximum level.
Nevertheless my model conﬁrms the results obtained in prev i o u sm o d e l st h a tm e r g e r sh e l p
to sustain higher prices.
The most intriguing part of the previous Proposition is to understand why even when
full collusion is more diﬃcult to sustain after merger, price increases. We are considering




δ(n − m,k − m) (14)




δ(n−m,k −m)) (full) collusion was sustainable before merger
b u ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l ea f t e rt h em e r g e r .( 1 4 )h o l d si fa n do n l yi f
m>(n +1 )
2k − n − 1
k
(15)
T h ek e yp o i n tt os o l v et h ep u z z l ei st or e a l i z et h a t( 1 5 )i m p l i e sk − m<
n − m +1
2
i.e.
cartel ﬁrms are in a minority position after the merger. Then Figure 2 shows that when
full collusion is not sustainable cartel ﬁrms adjust their quotas downwards what drives
the price upwards. So the puzzle created because we may have simultaneously that full
collusion becomes more diﬃcult with the merger and price increases is explained by the
anomalous feature of my model that price can decrease with the discount factor when
cartels ﬁnd themselves in a minority position.
15The following picture illustrates the issue. It depicts the evolution of price pre-merger
and post-merger for the speciﬁcc a s et h a tn =1 0 , k =7and m =5 ,w i t ha =1and
d =0 . Observe that in this case (15) holds.
Regarding mergers among fringe ﬁrms, the following proposition establishes its impact
on price
Proposition 2 Any merger of fringe ﬁrms strictly increases price.
As opposed to what happened in the previous Proposition, in this case, price strictly
increases even when the discount factor is such that (full) collusion is sustained both
pre-merger and post-merger. We have just seen that, in this case, the joint output of the
cartel ﬁrms does not change with the merger. However, as the merger reduces the number
































post-merger4T h e E ﬀect of Collusion on Mergers
In the last Section, we studied the eﬀect of mergers on price. In the present Section,
we focus on the private incentives to merge. It is well-known that the price increase by
itself does not guarantee that a merger is proﬁtable. For example, in a Cournot setting
(see the seminal paper Salant et al. (1983)), although mergers increase price, they are
(generally) not proﬁtable, because non merging ﬁrms react to the merger expanding their
production9. To understand this, recall that the output sold in equilibrium in the standard
linear Cournot model is given by: qi = a−c
n+1. When n decreases (because of a merger), qi
increases, harming the newly merged ﬁrm, reducing incentives to merge.
If as in Salant et al. (1983). we refer to the subset of ﬁr m st h a td on o tp a r t i c i p a t ei n
the proposed mergers as “outsiders”, we have that the present model (that encompasses
the Cournot case when δ =0 ) shares the same characteristic that outsiders increase their
market share and therefore merger proﬁtability can not be taken for granted. In our
model the outputs of cartel and fringe ﬁrms when δ <
_
δ(n,k) are given respectively by:
q
c(n,k,δ)=
(a − d)((1 + n)2 +( 1− 2k + n)(3 − 2k +3 n)δ)
(1 + n)3 − (1 + n)(1 − 2k + n)2δ
q
f(n,k,δ)=
(a − d)(1 − n(2 + n)(−1+δ) − δ +4 k2δ)
(1 + n)3 − (1 + n)(1 − 2k + n)2δ
.
Both the merger of cartel ﬁr m sa n dt h em e r g e ro ff r i n g eﬁrms increase the individual
output of nonmerging ﬁrms. For the merger of cartel ﬁrms the result follows from:
∂qc(n − m,k − m,δ)
∂m
> 0,a n d
∂qf(n − m,k − m,δ)
∂m
> 0
9Salant et al. (1983) shows that at least 80% of the ﬁrms must merge in order to make the merger
proﬁtable. See also Faulí-Oller (1997) or Hennessy (2000) for an extension to a wider range of demand
functions.
18and for the mergers of fringe ﬁrms from:
∂qc(n − m,k,δ)
∂m




The greater the reaction of outsiders to merger the lower its proﬁtability. We check
below that it crucially depends on the discount factor and therefore the discount factor
will be a key determinant of merger proﬁtability.
With these preliminaries at hand we are going to present the results on how merger
proﬁtability depends on the discount factor. First of all, I am going to deﬁne what I
understand by merger proﬁtability. Using the proﬁt functions deﬁn e di n( 1 0a n d1 1 ) ,t h e
proﬁtability of a merger of m +1cartel ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y :
Π
c
n−m,k−m − (m +1 )Π
c
n,k (16)
and the proﬁtability of a merger of m +1fringe ﬁrms by:
Π
f
n−m,k − (m +1 )Π
f
n,k.( 1 7 )
They are simply the diﬀerence between the proﬁts obtained by merging ﬁrms after
and before the merger. The following Propositions represent our main results. Proofs can
be found in the appendix. We restrict attention to the case where full collusion is not
sustained either before or after the merger.
Proposition 3 Merger proﬁtability among cartel ﬁrms decreases with the discount factor.
Proposition 3 shows that the following condition holds:
19∂(Πc
n−m,k−m − (m +1 ) Πc
n,k)
∂δ
< 0.( 1 8 )
The intuition for the result is as follows. In this model, ﬁrm’s ability to collude
depends on the discount factor: the greater the discount factor the greater the scope for
collusion. When mergers do not involve any cost saving, ﬁrms merge basically to restrict
competition. However, when competition is already low because ﬁrms are sustaining
collusive agreements, mergers lose attractiveness as an anticompetitive device. Thus, the
more ﬁrms can collude, the less they are interested in merging.
We turn now our attention to the private incentives of fringe ﬁrms to merge. The fol-
lowing Proposition makes clear that they are closely related with the value of the discount
factor that parametrizes the ability of cartel ﬁrms to reach collusive agreements. The key
point of Proposition 5 is that it establishes a connection between the level of collusion
achieved by cartel ﬁr m sa n dt h ep r o ﬁtability of mergers among ﬁrms not belonging to the
cartel. This connection will be used in the next Section to present an example where we
simultaneously have that cartel ﬁrms reduce their production and that fringe ﬁrms ﬁnd
proﬁtable to merge. This example will be related with the evolution of the oil market at
the end of 90’s that is characterized by the same two features, namely, the success of the
cartel and a wave of mergers of ﬁrms not belonging to the cartel.
Proposition 4 The proﬁtability of mergers among fringe ﬁrms increases with the dis-
count factor.
Proposition 4 shows that the following condition holds:
∂(Π
f




> 0.( 1 9 )
T h ek e yp o i n tt ou n d e r s t a n dt h er e s u l ti st h a ta sδ increases, cartel ﬁrms increase less
their output after a merger of fringe ﬁrms. In algebraic terms, this means that:
20∂2qc(n,k,δ)
∂n∂δ
> 0.( 2 0 )
In this case, the negative eﬀect on the proﬁtability of mergers because outsiders increase
their production is attenuated as an increase in the discount factor reduces the reaction
of ﬁrms belonging to the cartel.
4.1 Example
We present below a numerical example that illustrates the implications of the last Propo-
sition. In the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,w es h o wt h a tg i v e nam a r k e ts t r u c t u r et h ep r o ﬁtability of the
merger of fringe ﬁrms is positive for high values of the discount factors whereas it is neg-
ative for low values of the discount factor. In the second place, we show that the reason
of this result is that when δ is high cartel ﬁrms increase their output after merger much
less than when δ is low.
The exact speciﬁcation of the example is the following. Assume market demand is
given by P =1− Q and the marginal cost of ﬁrms is d = 1
2.W eh a v en =6ﬁrms and
k =4ﬁrms belong to the cartel. We are going to consider the eﬀect of the merger of
fringe ﬁr m sf o rt h ec a s eδ =0 .1 and δ =0 .5.
If δ =0 .1 we have that without the merger each cartel ﬁrm produces qc =0 .07 and





−2.6338 × 10−3 < 0.
If δ =0 .5 we have that without the merger each cartel ﬁrm produces qc =0 .0625 and





1.1703 × 10−3 > 0 (Results are summarized on the table).




qc =0 .07 Without merger.





6,4 = −2.6338 × 10−3 < 0
(21)




qc =0 .0625 Without merger.





6,4 =1 .1703 × 10−3 > 0
Table 1. Numerical Example.
The merger is only proﬁtable when δ is high. Cartel ﬁrms increase their output with
the merger by 0.01 if δ =0 .1 and by 0.0005 if δ =0 .5. This explains the diﬀerent results
on proﬁtability.
The example shows that if for some reason unexpectedly the discount factor jumped
from δ =0 .1 to δ =0 .5 we would observe the following adjustment in the strategies played
by ﬁrms: on the one hand, fringe ﬁrms would decide to merge and, on the other hand,
cartel ﬁrms would reduce their output from 0.07 to 0.063. This situation resembles what
happened in the oil market at the end of the 90’s: OPEC members agreed to cut their
quotas and private ﬁrms not belonging to the cartel decided to merge.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The main aim of this paper has been to develop a theoretical foundation of the impact
o fc o l l u s i o no nm e r g e rp r o ﬁtability and the eﬀect of horizontal mergers on a previously
collusive market.
We show that although the critical discount factor above which joint proﬁt maximiza-
tion could be sustained may increase (due to a merger), the eﬀect of a merger on price is
unambiguous, and price increases.
There exists a traditional view in Industrial Organization, following Salant al. (1983),
according to which there is little scope for merger proﬁtability when mergers do not
involve any cost saving and ﬁrms are in a Cournot environment. Our partial cartel model
predicts a positive (negative) correlation between the degree of collusion among cartel
ﬁrms and merger proﬁtability of fringe (cartel) ﬁrms. This can reinforce the tendency of
some groups of ﬁrms to merge in a non-competitive environment.
I nas i m p l ee x a m p l e ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a ts o m em e r g e r sa r eo n l yp r o ﬁtable whenever
the degree of collusion in the market is large enough.
22Hence, the model predicts that in a Partial Cartel model, fringe ﬁrms would have
an incentive to merge whenever the cartel is successful enough. Therefore, it should be
taken into account that collusion may not only directly increase price but also indirectly
by rendering proﬁtable mergers among fringe ﬁrms. The closest real example to our
model comes from the oil market. In the oil market at the end of the 90b4s, more or less
simultaneously, mergers among, what we considered fringe ﬁrms, and production cuts by
the cartel, the OPEC, took place. That could perhaps explain the wave of mergers among
oil ﬁrms at the end of the 90b4s.
Several issues have been left for future research. It could be fruitful to consider diﬀerent
types of mergers, like in Huck et al.(2001), considering mergers among ﬁrms of diﬀerent
types.(i.e. mergers within fringe and cartel ﬁrms). Second, as we let cartel ﬁrms pick up
the best equilibrium for them, it could be also considered other punishment phases that
could lead the cartel to better outcomes than using trigger strategies like for example
using an Optimal punishment, following Abreu (1986) and Abreu (1988).
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−(1+n)3+(1+n)(1−2k+n)2δ if δ < δ
a+d(1+2(n−k))








as the pre-merger and post merger cutoﬀs respectively.
First we will prove that the following is true:





First, we see that f(n − m,k − m,0) >f(n,k,0) On the other hand, we can see that
there exists only one δ ∈ (0,1) that solves f(n −m,k −m,δ)=f(n,k,δ). We will call it
δ
0.




,t h e nδ
0 > δ
1

















. Therefore, (23) is true.




}, (23) ensures that a merger (strictly) increases market price.









For the remaining values of δ,w eh a v et w od i ﬀerent relevant cases to consider: the ﬁrst












We know that p(n,k,δ
1





In the ﬁrst case, it is enough to check that f(n − m,k − m,δ) is strictly decreasing
with δ.T h i si st r u ei fm>2k − n − 1, and this holds as m>(n +1 )2k−n−1
k .
I nt h es e c o n dc a s ei ti se n o u g ht oc h e c kt h a tf(n,k,δ) is strictly increasing with δ,
and this is true if 2k − n − 1 > 0, and this holds as otherwise m<(n +1 ) 2k−n−1
k could
never hold.









like pre-merger and post-merger cutoﬀ respectively




},(24) is enough to prove that price strictly increases.












2(n−m−k+1) , price strictly increases.
For the remaining cases, when, as we have seen, we have two relevant cases: the
ﬁrst is if m>(n +1 ) n+1−2k




. The second case is if
m<(n +1 )n+1−2k









), it is enough to check that f(n−m,k,δ)
is increasing with δ, which is true if m>n−2k+1, and this holds as m>(n+1)n+1−2k
n−k+1 .




) (remember 24), it is enough to check
that f(n,k,δ) is decreasing with δ, which is true if n+1> 2k, and this holds as otherwise
m<(n +1 )n+1−2k
n−k+1 could never be true.
Proof of Proposition 3: Basically what we have to do is proving that (18) holds. If we




(1+n)6−2(1+n)4(1−2k+n)2δ+(1+n)2(1−2k+n)4δ2 . Therefore, it is tedious
but straightforward to show that (18) holds.






(1+n)6−2(1+n)4(1−2k+n)2δ+(1+n)2(1−2k+n)4δ2. We can also see that it is easy but
tedious to see that (19) holds.
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